1	A longitudinal analysis of the privacy paradox
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### Author Note

All authors contributed extensively to the work presented in this paper. TD, PM, & 7 ST designed the study; PM supervised the data collection; PM administered the data 8 importation; TD & PM wrote the code, ran the models, and analyzed the output data; TD 9 wrote most parts of manuscript, and PM & ST contributed individual sections and 10 comments; ST supervised the project and wrote the grant application (in 2012). The 11 authors declare no competing interests. This research was funded by the German Federal 12 Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) Grant 16KIS0094, awarded to Sabine Trepte. 13 This manuscript features a companion website that includes detailed summaries of 14 the statistical results, the code, additional analyses, and a reproducible version of the 15 manuscript (https://tdienlin.github.io/privacy-paradox-longitudinal). The data can be 16 downloaded from http://dx.doi.org/10.7802/1937 17

#### Abstract

The privacy paradox states that people's concerns about online privacy are unrelated to 19 their online sharing of personal information. On the basis of a representative sample of the 20 German population, which includes 1403 respondents interviewed at three waves separated 21 by 6 months, we investigate the privacy paradox from a longitudinal perspective. Using a 22 cross-lagged panel model with random intercepts, we differentiate between-person relations 23 from within-person effects. Results revealed that people who were more concerned about 24 their online privacy than others also shared slightly less personal information and had 25 substantially more negative attitudes toward information sharing (between-person level). 26 People who were more concerned than usual also shared slightly less information than 27 usual (within-person level). We found no long-term effects of privacy concerns on 28 information sharing or attitudes 6 months later. The results provide further evidence 29 against the privacy paradox, but more research is needed to better understand potential 30 causal relations. 31

Keywords: privacy paradox, privacy concerns, information sharing, longitudinal
 analysis, structural equation modeling

Word count: 5084

### A longitudinal analysis of the privacy paradox

The privacy paradox states that the information disclosure of Internet users is 36 problematic: Although many people are concerned about their privacy online, they still 37 share plenty of personal information on the web (e.g., Acquisti and Grossklags, 2003). The 38 privacy paradox is of considerable interest to society—it is discussed in newspapers (Frean, 39 2017), Wikipedia entries (Wikipedia, 2018), designated websites (New York Public Radio, 40 2018), books (Trepte and Reinecke, 2011), and top-tier academic journals (Acquisti et al., 41 2015). If the privacy paradox really exists, it should inspire worry: It would suggest that 42 online behavior is irrational and that people are revealing too much of their personal 43 information, which can cause various problems (e.g., Sevignani, 2016). Understanding why 44 people disclose information online and whether or not this is paradoxical therefore 45 represents an important challenge. 46

However, current research on the privacy paradox has one major limitation. To the 47 best of our knowledge, most empirical studies conducted so far have investigated the 48 privacy paradox from a between-person perspective. By employing empirical tests of 49 relations between people (e.g., cross-sectional questionnaires analyzed with multiple 50 regression or Pearson correlations), studies have analyzed whether people who are more 51 concerned than *others* also share less personal information than *others*. Although such a 52 perspective is interesting and represents a viable first step, it cannot make informed claims 53 regarding causality. The privacy paradox, however, implies a causal perspective: Does a 54 person, if they become more concerned about online privacy, then also share less personal 55 information? This mismatch is problematic because although between-person relations are, 56 except for some special cases, a *necessary* condition for causal within-person effects, they 57 are by no means a *sufficient* one. For example, it could be that the between-person relation 58 is determined by other third variables. Hence, as the next step in investigating the privacy 59 paradox and to better understand the causal relation between privacy concerns and 60 information sharing, it is necessary to conduct studies with within-person designs. 61

With this study we aim to answer four major questions. First, on a between-person 62 level, how are concerns about online privacy related to the online sharing of personal 63 information? Second, on a within-person level, is information sharing lower than usual 64 when concerns are higher than usual? Third, what are the potential long-term effects? Are 65 changes in concerns related to changes in information sharing 6 months later and/or vice 66 versa? Fourth, what is the role of privacy attitudes, do they mediate the relation between 67 privacy concerns and information sharing? To best answer and contextualize these 68 questions, we first provide an in-depth theoretical analysis of the privacy paradox, after 69 which we present the empirical results of a longitudinal panel study, which is representative 70 of the German population. 71

# 72 A Brief History of the Privacy Paradox

Acquisti and Grossklags (2003) were among the first to argue that the online 73 disclosure of personal information is paradoxical. "Experiments reveal that very few 74 individuals actually take any action to protect their personal information, even when doing 75 so involves limited costs" (p.1). Three years later, Barnes (2006) discussed the behavior of 76 young people on SNSs, popularizing the term *privacy paradox*. Barnes considered the 77 following six aspects of online behavior particularly paradoxical: (a) illusion of privacy, (b) 78 high quantity of information sharing, (c) attitude behavior discrepancy, (d) lack of privacy 79 concerns, (e) lack of privacy literacy, and (f) fabrication of false information. Norberg et al. 80 (2007) were one of the first to empirically analyze the privacy paradox explicitly. The 81 study found a mismatch between concerns and behavior, which is aligned with several 82 other experimental studies conducted at the time (Beresford et al., 2012; Hann et al., 2007; 83 Huberman et al., 2005). 84

<sup>85</sup> While there are various understandings and operationalizations of the privacy
<sup>86</sup> paradox (Kokolakis, 2017), subsequent research focused on Barnes's third tenet, the
<sup>87</sup> attitude-behavior discrepancy. Whereas some studies reported that privacy concerns were

not significantly related to the disclosure of personal information (e.g., Gross and Acquisti,
2005; Taddicken, 2014; Tufekci, 2008), which lends credence to the privacy paradox, a
different set of studies showed significant relations (e.g., Dienlin and Trepte, 2015; Heirman
et al., 2013; Walrave et al., 2012), which refutes the privacy paradox.

Notably, in a parallel line of research other studies have also analyzed the relation
between privacy concerns and information sharing. However, the term privacy paradox was
often not used explicitly. Instead, studies have referred to the so-called *privacy calculus*,
which states that the sharing of personal information online is affected by both the
respective costs and the anticipated benefits (Culnan and Armstrong, 1999). By now,
several studies have found empirical support for the privacy calculus in various online
contexts (e.g., Bol et al., 2018; Dienlin and Metzger, 2016; Krasnova et al., 2010).

Baruh et al. (2017) published the first empirical meta-analysis on the relations 99 between privacy concerns and various forms of social media use (e.g., information sharing 100 or SNS usage). On the basis of 37 studies, Baruh et al. (2017) found a small and significant 101 statistical relation between concerns about online privacy and online information sharing (r102 = -.13, 95% CI [-.07, -.18]). Another more recent meta analysis by Yu et al. (2020) also 103 finds a significant bivariate relation between privacy concerns and information sharing, 104 albeit smaller (r = -.06, 95% CI [-.01, -.12]). There also exist several systematic literature 105 reviews on the privacy paradox (Barth and Jong, 2017; Gerber et al., 2018; Kokolakis, 106 2017). Kokolakis (2017) come to the conclusion that "the dichotomy between privacy 107 attitude and behaviour should not be considered a paradox anymore." (p. 130) However, 108 the authors also note that the privacy paradox is a "complex phenomenon that has not 100 been fully explained yet". Barth and Jong (2017) are more skeptical, and argue that 110 "attempts to theoretically explain and practically solve the problem of the privacy paradox 111 are still scarce and we feel the subject deserves far more research attention" (p. 1052). 112

# <sup>113</sup> Defining Privacy Concerns and Information Sharing

Privacy is defined as the "[...] voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from 114 the general society through physical or psychological means  $[\ldots]$ " (Westin, 1967: 7). 115 Privacy captures aspects of both volitional *control* and social *separateness* (Bräunlich et 116 al., 2020; Marwick and boyd, 2014). People from all cultural backgrounds require privacy 117 to fulfill fundamental needs including personal care, protected communication, intimacy, or 118 sexuality (Altman, 1977; Westin, 1967). Being a universal human right (UN General 119 Assembly, 1948, Art. 12), privacy is essential for safety, psychosocial flourishing, and 120 dignity. It is driven by both individual needs and interpersonal negotiations thereof 121 (Trepte, 2020). 122

Several dimensions of privacy have been proposed. For example, it is possible to 123 distinguish a vertical and a horizontal level (Masur, 2018). Whereas the vertical level 124 captures privacy from authorities, institutions, or companies, horizontal privacy addresses 125 privacy from peers, colleagues, or other people. When it comes to concerns in general, 126 interestingly they do not seem to be established as a stand-alone theoretical concept in 127 psychology (Colman, 2015). Concerns are usually understood as an uneasy mix of "interest, 128 uncertainty, and apprehension" (Merriam-Webster, 2018). As a theoretical construct, 129 privacy concerns can hence be categorized as an affective motivational disposition. Taken 130 together, concerns about online privacy represent how much an individual is motivated to 131 focus on their control over a voluntary withdrawal from other people or societal institutions 132 on the Internet, accompanied by an uneasy feeling that their privacy might be threatened. 133 The online sharing of personal information, on the other hand, captures how much 134 person-related information people share when they use the Internet. Information sharing 135

<sup>137</sup> because it comprises all verbal and nonverbal information that is emitted (e.g., Watzlawick
<sup>138</sup> et al., 2011). Self-disclosure is more narrow, because it focuses on deliberate revelations
<sup>139</sup> about the true self to others, including aspects such as personal fears, values, or plans (e.g.,

can be differentiated from communication and self-disclosure. Communication is broad,

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Jourard, 1964). Information sharing is even more specific, because it addresses only
person-related information, including information about their age, sex, name, address,
health, and finances.

In what follows we hence investigate the two concepts of (a) concerns about online privacy and (b) online information sharing, aiming to investigate how they relate conceptually. In doing so, we adopt and focus on the perspective of individual people.

#### <sup>146</sup> The Relation Between Privacy Concerns and Information Sharing

<sup>147</sup> Currently, there is a lack of studies that explicitly analyze how behavior is affected by <sup>148</sup> concerns in general. Fortunately, however, we know much about the behavioral effects of <sup>149</sup> related concepts such as attitudes or fears, which all can affect behavior, sometimes <sup>150</sup> profoundly (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010; Rogers, 1983). Emotions, perhaps the concept most <sup>151</sup> closely related to concerns, have a particularly strong effect on behavior. By causing fight, <sup>152</sup> flight, or freeze reactions, they are a primordial trigger of behavior and are considered to be <sup>153</sup> an adaptive mechanism of evolved species (Dolan, 2002).

Also empirically, concerns have been shown to affect behavior (Hayes and Ross, 1987; Reel et al., 2007). For example, people more concerned about the environment show more environment-related behaviors (Bamberg, 2003). Taken together, it is reasonable to expect that also concerns about online privacy should somehow reflect in the online sharing of personal information.

At the same time, there are some factors that likely diminish the relation. Most prominently, there is the so-called *attitude behavior gap* (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010), which states that people sometimes act against their own attitudes. Evidently, not everyone concerned about their physical health exercises regularly. The explanation is simple: Other factors such as subjective norms and perceived behavioral control also determine behavior (Ajzen, 1985), which automatically reduces the impact of attitudes or concerns.

<sup>165</sup> Specifically, two of the most influential factors that affect online information sharing

are (a) strong subjective norms (Heirman et al., 2013) and (b) expected benefits (Krasnova 166 et al., 2010). In other words, users often prioritize social support, special offers, or 167 improved services, accepting that their privacy will be diminished. Sometimes, privacy 168 concerns do not relate to information sharing, because users lack the skills, knowledge, or 169 literacy to change their online behavior, creating feelings of apathy or cynicism (Hargittai 170 and Marwick, 2016; Hoffmann et al., 2016). Likewise, personal information is also often 171 shared by others, a phenomenon described as "networked privacy" (Marwick and boyd, 172 2014), which further reduces the power of individuals to determine how much personal 173 information can be found online. Trepte et al. (2014) listed several factors that can 174 additionally attenuate the relation: lack of strength of concerns, absence of negative 175 personal experiences, or situational constraints due to social desirability. In conclusion, 176 also in the context of the privacy paradox it is not reasonable to expect a perfect relation 177 between attitudes and behaviors. However, we should still expect to find a relation that is 178 small or moderate. 179

There are also some methodological explanations as to why some studies did not 180 detect statistically significant relations. Researchers are always confronted with the 181 so-called *Duhem-Quine problem*, according to which it is impossible to test theories in 182 isolation, because empirical tests always rely on auxiliary assumptions (Dienes, 2008). In 183 other words, if a psychological experiment fails, we do not know whether the theory is 184 wrong or the questionnaire subpar. This tenet is particularly relevant for the privacy 185 paradox: Detecting statistical significance for small effects—and, again, we should expect 186 to find small or moderate effects—is more challenging because it means that large samples 187 are necessary to guarantee sufficient statistical power.<sup>1</sup> Precisely, in order to be capable of 188 detecting a correlation between privacy concerns and information sharing in 95% of all 189 cases, which Baruh et al. (2017) estimated to be r = -.13, we need a sample of N = 762190

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Statistical power describes the probability of statistically detecting an effect that exists empirically. Only with high statistical power is it possible to make valid claims about an effect's existence (Cohen, 1992).

people. The reality, however, looks different: In their meta-analysis, Baruh et al. (2017) 191 reported a median sample size of N = 300, which can explain why several studies did not 192 find significant effects. 193

In conclusion, we expect to find a small significant relation between privacy concerns 194 and information sharing, both on the between-person level (Hypothesis 1) and the 195 within-person level (Hypothesis 2).<sup>2</sup> 196

Hypothesis 1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than others 197 will also be less likely to share personal information online than others. 198

Hypothesis 2: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than they 199 usually are will also share less personal information online than they usually do. 200

#### Long-Term Perspective 201

Although short-term effects are likely, it is still unclear whether long-term effects 202 exist as well. First, when analyzing potential long-term effects, it is important to choose an 203 interval that is both plausible and relevant. It makes a large difference whether the effects 204 of alcohol consumption on driving performance are tested after say 1 minute, 1 hour, or 1 205 day. One factor that determines an interval's optimal length is the stability of the variables 206 (Dormann and Griffin, 2015). Privacy concerns and privacy attitudes are predominantly 207 trait-like constructs with high stabilities, which is why they necessitate longer intervals. 208 Other studies with comparable research questions have therefore used an interval of 6 209 months (e.g., Valkenburg and Peter, 2009), which we adopt also in this study. 210 In general, we believe that it should be possible to find long-term effects. It has been 211 argued that privacy concerns affect privacy behavior in the long run (e.g., Heirman et al.,

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 $^{2}$  To explain, with Hypothesis 1, we compare *different* people with one another by analyzing their *average* values across all measurements. In other words, does a person, who is generally more concerned than others, also generally share less information than others? With Hypothesis 2, we compare *specific* measurements within the same person. In other words, does a person, if they are more concerned on T1 than on average, share more or less information on T1 than on average?

2013). The underlying theoretical mechanism could be that the emotional part of privacy 213 concerns causes (a) motivated information selection and (b) motivated information 214 processing, which is likely to change actual behavior (Nabi, 1999). Specifically, when 215 privacy concerns are higher than usual (e.g., because of experienced or witnessed privacy 216 infringements), people might begin reading more media articles on privacy issues and might 217 also consume these articles more carefully, which could prompt information sharing 218 practices that are more cautious. Also empirically, a study with 290 participants found 219 small negative longitudinal (between-person) relations between privacy concerns and 220 self-disclosure (Koohikamali et al., 2019). 221

At the same time, the adverse effect seems plausible as well, with two potential 222 outcomes. On the one hand, the long-term relation could be positive: If people start to 223 share more information online, they might become increasingly aware that their privacy is 224 at risk, thereby stirring concern (Tsay-Vogel et al., 2018). On the other hand, the 225 long-term relation might also be negative: When people share more personal information 226 online they might become accustomed to doing so, which potentially reduces concern [for 227 example, due to the mere exposure effect; Zajonc (1968)]. Finally, there could also be no 228 long-term relation at all: People might have already become used to sharing information 229 online, which stifles further cognitive or emotional processing. This rationale is central to 230 privacy cynicism (e.g., Hoffmann et al., 2016). 231

Research Question 1.1: Do changes in concerns about online privacy affect the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

Research Question 1.2: Do changes in the online sharing of personal information
 affect concerns about online privacy 6 months later?

# 236 The Role of Attitudes

It has been argued that privacy attitudes could bridge the gap between concerns and information sharing (e.g., Dienlin and Trepte, 2015). In contrast to general and implicit

privacy concerns, privacy attitudes capture a more explicit, specific cognitive appraisal 239 (Tsay-Vogel et al., 2018). Because general dispositions oftentimes affect more specific 240 appraisals (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010), general concerns about privacy may similarly affect 241 more specific privacy attitudes (Dienlin and Trepte, 2015). This reasoning follows the 242 rational choice paradigm (Simon, 1955), which maintains that behavior is always at least 243 partially influenced by specific convictions, attitudes, and cost-benefit analyses. Therefore, 244 although both variables are related to information disclosure, attitudes are likely the better 245 predictor. Also empirically, a study of 1,042 youths from Belgium found that the relation 246 between privacy attitudes and disclosure intentions of personal information was strong (r247 = .56), whereas the relation between privacy concerns and disclosure intentions was only 248 moderate [r = -.29; Heirman et al. (2013)]. 249

Hypothesis 3.1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than others will also hold a less positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than others.

Hypothesis 3.2: People with a more positive attitude toward the online sharing of
personal information than others will also share more information online than others.
Hypothesis 4.1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than they
usually are will also hold a less positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal
information than they usually do.

Hypothesis 4.2: People with a more positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than they usually have will also share more information online than they usually do.

Concerning the potential long-term relations of privacy attitudes, we are confronted with the same situation mentioned above. Because we are not aware of research on long-term relations, several scenarios seem plausible. Attitudes could either have long-term relations or not, and information sharing could either foster privacy attitudes or diminish them.

266	Research Question 2.1: Do changes in concerns about online privacy affect attitudes
267	toward the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?
268	Research Question 2.2: Do changes in attitudes toward the online sharing of personal
269	information affect concerns about online privacy 6 months later?
270	Research Question 3.1: Do changes in attitudes toward the online sharing of personal
271	information affect the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?
272	Research Question 3.2: Do changes in the online sharing of personal information
273	affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

# Method

### 275 Procedure and Respondents

This study is part of a large-scale project which investigates the development of privacy and self-disclosure, including several other variables. Other publications linked to the project can be accessed at https://osf.io/y35as/. The data come from a longitudinal paper-and-pencil questionnaire study, in which a representative sample of the German population (16 years and older) was surveyed on overall five occasions. The data can be downloaded from https://doi.org/10.7802/1937.

The first three waves were collected from May 2014 to May 2015, with intervals of 6 282 months each. The last two waves were collected on May 2016 and May 2017, and had an 283 interval of one year. Because we hypothesized the effects to take place across half a year, 284 the last two waves were not included in the analyses presented here. First, a sample of 285 14,714 potential respondents was drawn from a representative omnibus survey in Germany 286 (ADM master sample), using a random last-two-digit dialing procedure. In this CATI 287 screening, 5,286 respondents agreed to participate in all following waves. Wave 1 was 288 completed by 3,278 respondents (response rate: 38%), Wave 2 by 2,448 respondents 289 (attrition rate: 25%), and Wave 3 by 2,021 respondents (attrition rate: 17%). We filtered 290 respondents who never used the Internet at all waves, answered fewer than 50% of the 291

items in each scale for at least one wave, provided inconsistent birth-dates across measurements, or did not report sociodemographic variables. The final sample consisted of n = 1,403 respondents.

In the final sample, the rate of missing data was 5.40%. Visual inspection of the missing value patterns as well as the non-parametric test by Jamshidian et al. (2014) suggested that all missing values could be considered missing at random (p = .514). Therefore, Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation was conducted using all available data. The average age was 54 years (SD = 15 years), and 49% were male. About 39% reported that they had graduated from college.

#### 301 Measures

We tested the factorial validity of all measures using confirmatory factor analysis 302 (CFA). Each CFA included the items from all three waves. For each item, factor loadings 303 were constrained to be equal across waves. Constrained and unconstrained models were 304 compared using  $\chi^2$  differences tests. All results were nonsignificant, suggesting longitudinal 305 factorial invariance. The measures showed good composite reliability in all three waves. 306 Graphical displays of the variables' distributions showed that privacy concerns were skewed 307 to the left, privacy attitudes were normally distributed, and information sharing was 308 skewed to the right (Figure 2, diagonal). We calculated intraclass correlation coefficients 309 (ICCs) to quantify how much variance in the variables' factor scores could be attributed to 310 between-person differences. An English translation of the original German items can be 311 found in the online supplementary material. 312

Concerns about online privacy. Privacy concerns were measured as a second-order factor. Three self-developed items captured the vertical dimension (e.g., "How concerned are you that institutions or intelligence services collect and analyze data that you disclosed on the Internet?"), and three items by Buchanan et al. (2007) captured the horizontal dimension (e.g., "How concerned are you that people that you do not know variance was explained by differences between persons.

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might obtain information about you because of you online activities?"). Respondents rated all items on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all concerned) to 5 (very concerned). The means were  $M_{t1} = 3.67$ ,  $M_{t2} = 3.62$ ,  $M_{t3} = 3.59$ , and the standard deviations  $SD_{t1} =$ 0.88,  $SD_{t2} = 0.89$ , and  $SD_{t3} = 0.90$ . The two-dimensional model fit the data well,  $\chi^2(118)$ = 661.17, p < .001, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [.05, .06], SRMR = .04. The reliability was high ( $\omega_{t1} = .95$ ,  $\omega_{t2} = .96$ ,  $\omega_{t3} = .97$ ). Overall, 73.85% of the measure's

The online sharing of personal information. To measure respondent's level of 325 information disclosure, they were asked how often they disclosed 10 different pieces of 326 information on the Internet (European Commission, 2011). The exact question was: "How 327 often do you disclose the following pieces of information online (i.e., on the Internet)?" 328 Each item was answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (daily). Factor 329 analyses suggested a second-order factor structure with five first-order factors of two items 330 each. The first first-order factor subsumed financial and medical information, the second 331 first and last name, the third place of residence and street (including house number), the 332 fourth email address and phone number, and the fifth information about education and 333 current job. The means were  $M_{t1} = 2.12$ ,  $M_{t2} = 2.13$ ,  $M_{t3} = 2.10$ , and the standard 334 deviations  $SD_{t1} = 0.66$ ,  $SD_{t2} = 0.64$ , and  $SD_{t3} = 0.61$ . The model fit the data adequately, 335  $\chi^2(375) = 2527.69, p < .001, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .06, 90\% CI [.06, .07], SRMR = .06.$ 336 The reliability was high ( $\omega_{t1} = .91, \omega_{t2} = .92, \omega_{t3} = .91$ ). Overall, 64.29% of the measure's 337 variance was explained by differences between persons. 338

Attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information. Respondents' attitudes toward disclosing personal information online were captured with 10 items that measured the general appraisal of disclosing the same 10 pieces of information (European Commission, 2011). Adhering to the principle of compatibility (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010), the items were parallel to those of the actual disclosure scale. Specifically, we asked: "Do you think that it is sensible to disclose the following pieces of information online (i.e., on the Internet)?" The scale ranged from 1 (not at all sensible) to 5 (very sensible). The means were  $M_{t1} = 3.67$ ,  $M_{t2} = 3.62$ ,  $M_{t3} = 3.59$ , and the standard deviations  $SD_{t1} = 0.88$ ,  $SD_{t2} = 0.89$ , and  $SD_{t3} = 0.90$ . The second-order model with five first-order factors showed an adequate model fit,  $\chi^2(375) = 2683.43$ , p < .001, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .07, 90% CI [.06, .07], SRMR = .08. The reliability was high ( $\omega_{t1} = .88$ ,  $\omega_{t2} = .89$ ,  $\omega_{t3} = .87$ ). Overall, 59.19% of the measure's variance was explained by differences between persons.

#### 351 Data Analysis

We follow the recommendation by Lakens, Adolfi, et al. (2018) and first justify the 352 choice of our alpha level. We determined adequate error margins by considering the 353 potential implications of both false positive and false negative findings (i.e., alpha and beta 354 errors): On the one hand, if we committed an alpha error, we would wrongfully conclude 355 that people's concerns and behaviors are consistent. Communicating such a false result to 356 the public might unjustly reassure people when they should be more alert. On the other 357 hand, if we committed a beta error, we would wrongfully conclude that individuals behave 358 paradoxically. Communicating such a false result would unjustly accuse people of 359 implausible behavior, potentially causing unnecessary distress or reactance. We consider 360 both errors to be equally detrimental. Hence, we chose balanced error rates, setting a 361 maximum error rate of 5% for both alpha and beta. As the smallest effect size of interest 362 [SESOI; Lakens, Scheel, et al. (2018)], we chose to consider effects that are at least small 363 [i.e., standardized coefficients above  $\beta = .10$ ; Cohen (1992)] as able to offer empirical 364 support for our theoretical hypotheses. Significantly smaller effects were not considered 365 able to offer support. The six hypotheses were tested with a one-tailed approach and the 366 six research questions with a two-tailed approach. On the basis of the balanced alpha-beta 367 approach with a maximum error probability of 5%, a desired power of 95%, and an SESOI 368 of  $\beta = .10$ , we calculated a minimum sample size of 1,293 respondents. Given the final 369 sample size of 1,403 respondents, alpha and beta errors were balanced for our hypotheses 370

(research questions) when we used a critical alpha of 3% (4.20%), resulting in a power of
97% (95.80%) to detect small effects.



*Figure 1*. The estimated random-intercept cross-lagged panel model (RI-CLPM).

The data were analyzed using of a random-intercept cross-lagged panel model 373 (RI-CLPM, Hamaker et al., 2015). For a visualization, see Figure 1. Note that in contrast 374 to regular cross-lagged panel models (CLPMs), RI-CLPMs can separate between-person 375 variance from within-person variance. We used factor scores as observed variables to 376 represent the variables' latent structure more closely. We tested H1, H3.1, and H3.2 by 377 correlating the random intercepts, which represent the respondents' individual mean scores 378 across all three waves. We tested H2, H4.1, and H4.2 by correlating the respondents' 379 within-person variance at T1, which captures their specific deviation at T1 from their 380 overall score. We tested all research questions by regressing variables on all other measures 381 obtained 6 months earlier. Given that we had three points of measurement, this resulted in 382 two estimates for each research question. As we did not assume longitudinal effects to 383 differ across time, they were constrained to be equal across all waves, which produces one 384 single general measure of each effect instead of two time-specific ones. (We later tested this 385

assumption empirically. As expected, the model with constrained effects did not show significantly reduced model fit,  $\chi^2(9) = .114$ , p = 14.25, which supports that effects did not change over time.) Fit was assessed according to the common criteria as described by Kline (2016). The final model fit the data well,  $\chi^2(15) = 25.18$ , p = .048, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .02, 90% CI [< .01, .04], SRMR = .01.

For the analyses, we used R [Version 4.0.3; R Core Team (2018)] and the R-packages 391 GGally [Version 2.1.1; Schloerke et al. (2018)], qqplot2 [Version 3.3.3; Wickham (2016)], 392 lavaan [Version 0.6.8; Rosseel (2012)], MissMech [Version 1.0.2; Jamshidian et al. (2014)], 393 MVN [Version 5.8; Korkmaz et al. (2014)], psych [Version 2.1.3; Revelle (2018)], pwr 394 [Version 1.3.0; Champely (2018)], sem Tools [Version 0.5.4; Jorgensen et al. (2018)], and 395 sistats [Version 0.18.1; Lüdecke (2019)]. The code, additional analyses (e.g., ICCs or 396 analyses of invariance), and a reproducible version of this manuscript can be found on the 397 manuscript's companion website at 398

<sup>399</sup> https://tdienlin.github.io/privacy-paradox-longitudinal/.

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# Results

In a first descriptive step, we analyzed the variables' bivariate relations. All variables associated with the hypotheses showed correlations that were in line with our theoretical rationales (Figure 2, above the diagonal).

Hypothesis 1 predicted that people reporting higher concerns about online privacy 404 than others would also be less likely to share personal information online than others. 405 Results revealed that the random intercepts of the two variables were significantly 406 correlated ( $\beta = -.09, b = -0.03, 95\%$  CI [-0.05, -0.01], z = -2.57, p = .005). Hence, 407 respondents who—on average across all three waves—were more concerned about their 408 privacy than others also shared slightly less personal information online. The effect was 409 small. When looking at the standardized effect's confidence interval (i.e.,  $\beta = -.09, 95\%$  CI 410 [-.15, -.02], it was not significantly smaller than our SESOI of beta = .10. Thus, 411



*Figure 2*. Results of the bivariate relations. Above the diagonal: zero-order correlation matrix; diagonal: density plots for each variable; below the diagonal: bivariate scatter plots for zero-order correlations. Solid regression lines represent linear regressions, dashed regression lines represent quadratic regressions. Calculated with the variables' latent factor scores.

<sup>412</sup> Hypothesis 1 was supported.

<sup>413</sup> Hypothesis 2 proposed that if people perceived more concerns about their online
<sup>414</sup> privacy than they usually do, they would also share less personal information online than

they usually do. Results revealed a small significant correlation ( $\beta = -.10, b = -0.02, 95\%$ 415 CI [-0.03, > -0.01], z = -2.37, p = .009), suggesting that if respondents were more 416 concerned about their online privacy at T1 than usual, they also shared less personal 417 information online at T1 than usual. In conclusion, the results supported Hypothesis 2. 418 With Research Question 1.1, we analyzed the longitudinal relation of concerns about 419 online privacy and the online sharing of personal information 6 months later. No significant 420 lagged effect across 6 months was found ( $\beta = .01, b = 0.01, 95\%$  CI [-0.05, 0.07], z = 0.41, 421 p = .683). With Research Question 1.2, we investigated the longitudinal relation of the 422 online sharing of personal information and concerns about online privacy 6 months later, 423 again revealing no significant effect ( $\beta = -.03, b = -0.03, 95\%$  CI [-0.09, 0.04], z = -0.80, p424 = .422). 425

Hypothesis 3.1 predicted that people who perceived more privacy concerns than 426 others would also hold more negative attitudes toward the online sharing of personal 427 information than others. The results revealed a medium-sized negative correlation between 428 the two variables on the between-person level ( $\beta = -.31, b = -0.11, 95\%$  CI [-0.14, -0.08], z 429 = -8.46, p < .001). Thus, people who—on average across all three waves—reported being 430 more concerned about their online privacy relative to the rest of the sample, were also 431 substantially more likely to hold a more negative attitude toward the online sharing of 432 personal information. The results therefore supported Hypothesis 3.1. Hypothesis 3.2 433 stated that people who held more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal 434 information than others would also share more personal information online than others. 435 Results showed a very strong between-person correlation between the two variables ( $\beta =$ 436 .66, b = 0.15, 95% CI [0.13, 0.17], z = 15.12, p < .001). In other words, when averaged 437 across all three waves, if people had more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of 438 personal information than others, they were much more likely to actually share personal 439 information online. In conclusion, the results supported Hypothesis 3.2. 440

441 Hypothesis 4.1 proposed that people who perceived more privacy concerns than usual

would also hold more negative attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 442 than usual. The results did not reveal a significant effect ( $\beta = -.06, b = -0.01, 95\%$  CI 443 [-0.03, < 0.01], z = -1.38, p = .084). Hypothesis 4.2 proposed that people who held more 444 positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information than usual would also 445 share more personal information online than usual. Results showed a moderate 446 within-person correlation between the two variables ( $\beta = .15, b = 0.03, 95\%$  CI [0.02, 0.05], 447 z = 4.01, p < .001), which indicates that when respondents had more positive attitudes at 448 T1 than usual, they also shared more personal information than usual. In conclusion, the 449 results supported Hypothesis 4.2. 450

With Research Question 2.1, we analyzed the longitudinal relations of concerns about online privacy and positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information. No significant effect was found ( $\beta = -.02$ , b = -0.02, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.06], z = -0.47, p = .641). Regarding Research Question 2.2, again no significant longitudinal relations emerged between privacy attitudes and privacy concerns 6 months later ( $\beta < .01$ , b < 0.01, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.06], z = 0.06, p = .951).

Research Question 3.1 asked whether changes in attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information would affect changes in personal information sharing 6 months later. No significant effect was found ( $\beta > -.01$ , b > -0.01, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.05], z = -0.07, p= .947). Next, Research Question 3.2 asked whether changes in the online sharing of personal information would affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 6 months later. Again, no significant effect was found ( $\beta = .04$ , b = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.11], z = 1.15, p = .249).

#### Table 1 presents an overview of all results.

In an additional analysis, we also tested the same model with a 1 year interval, which allowed to include data spanning until winter 2016 and 2017. Most effects remained the same. For example, we again found that people more concerned than others were less positive regarding information sharing (r = -.36, p < .001) and shared less information (r

# Table 1

Parameter Estimates Obtained in the Random-Intercept Cross-Lagged Panel Model

	95% CI				
Effect	b	11	ul	beta	р
Between-person correlations across all waves					
Privacy concern $<->$ information sharing	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	09	.005
Privacy concern $<->$ positive attitude	-0.11	-0.14	-0.08	31	< .001
Positive attitude $<->$ information sharing	0.15	0.13	0.17	.66	< .001
Within-person correlations at T1					
Privacy concern $<->$ information sharing	-0.02	-0.03	> -0.01	10	.009
Privacy concern $<->$ positive attitude	-0.01	-0.03	< 0.01	06	.084
Positive attitude $<->$ information sharing	0.03	0.02	0.05	.15	< .001
Within-person effects across 6 months					
Privacy concern $\rightarrow$ information sharing	0.01	-0.05	0.07	.01	.683
Information sharing $\rightarrow$ privacy concern	-0.03	-0.09	0.04	03	.422
Privacy concern -> positive attitude	-0.02	-0.09	0.06	02	.641
Positive attitude -> privacy concern	< 0.01	-0.06	0.06	< .01	.951
Positive attitude -> information sharing	> -0.01	-0.06	0.05	>01	.947
Information sharing $\rightarrow$ positive attitude	0.04	-0.03	0.11	.04	.249

*Note.* The between-person correlations represent interpersonal relations. For example, results showed that people who were more concerned than others, averaged across all three waves, also shared less information than others. The within-person parameters reflect how intrapersonal changes in one variable are related to intra-personal changes in another. For example, results showed that if a person was more concerned at T1 than usual, they also shared less information than usual.  $_{469}$  = -.15, p = .002). Likewise, people more positive toward data sharing than others also shared substantially more data (r = .66, p < .001). Because including these two additional waves significantly reduces sample size, and because we consider it more likely that effects take place more immediately, these results should be considered exploratory. For an overview of the results, see the additional analyses on our companion website (Section 2.1.2.7).

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# Discussion

Most research on the privacy paradox suggests a significant small effect of privacy 476 concerns on the online sharing of personal information (e.g., Baruh et al., 2017). However, 477 whereas the theoretical premise of the privacy paradox addresses a within-person *effect*, 478 most empirical studies have analyzed only between-person *relations*. On the basis of a 479 representative sample of the German population, from which three waves of data separated 480 by 6 months were collected, we hence analyzed the privacy paradox by differentiating 481 general between-person relations, short-term within-person relations, as well as long-term 482 within-person effects. Together, this approach allows for informed inferences about the 483 variables' causal relationship. 484

The results of the between-person analyses showed that people who were more 485 concerned about their privacy than others were slightly less likely to share personal 486 information. In addition, people who were more concerned about their privacy than others 487 also held substantially more negative attitudes toward disclosing personal information 488 online. Notably, we found a very strong between-person correlation between attitudes 489 toward information sharing and actual information sharing, which shows that typical 490 online disclosure can be predicted precisely by a person's attitude. Taken together, the 491 cross-sectional results are in line with the extant literature: The between-person correlation 492 of privacy concerns and information sharing found in this study (i.e.,  $\beta = -.09$ ) fall within 493 the 95% confidence interval of the effect reported by Baruh et al. (2017) (i.e., r = -.13, 494

<sup>495</sup> 95% CI [-.07, -.18]). Notably, the between-person correlations reported here represent
<sup>496</sup> averaged measurements across three waves, which makes the findings more robust than
<sup>497</sup> typical one-shot measures.

In conclusion, this study suggests that the privacy paradox does not exist on a 498 between-person level. The differences between people with regard to their online 490 information sharing behavior can be explained by differences in their privacy concerns to a 500 small extent, and by differences in their privacy attitudes to a large extent. The more 501 specific we become, the better we can explain online behavior: Whereas privacy concerns 502 are related only weakly to online information sharing (e.g., Baruh et al., 2017), more 503 specific risks perceptions are related to behavior more closely (e.g., Bol et al., 2018; Yu et 504 al., 2020), whereas behavioral attitudes are the best predictors (Dienlin and Trepte, 2015). 505

The within-person results showed that when a person's privacy concerns are higher than usual, the same person also shared slightly less information online than usual. Moreover, people who developed more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information than usual, also shared substantially more personal information online. Together, changes in concerns and attitudes are therefore related to changes in behavior, which speaks against the privacy paradox also on the within-person level.

We did not find any long-term effects, however. Changes in both privacy concerns 512 and attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information were not related to any 513 meaningful changes in the online sharing of personal information 6 months later (and vice 514 versa). As an explanation, it might be the case that changes in privacy concern affect 515 information sharing more immediately. To test this assumption, we would need studies 516 with shorter intervals (Keijsers, 2016). Moreover, given that the directions of most 517 longitudinal relations were in line with the between-person and within-person relations, 518 longitudinal effects might indeed take place, but only that they are very small. Of course, 519 it could also be that longterm longitudinal effects do not exist. 520

# 521 Limitations

The data were collected between May 2014 and May 2015—hence, after the Snowden 522 revelations in 2013, but before the Equifax data breach in 2017, the Cambridge Analytica 523 data breach in 2018, or the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation in 524 2018. Such sweeping events, however, could affect privacy concerns, online behavior, or 525 their mutual relation, which would limit the generalizability of our results. Although this is 526 an important caveat, we have reason to believe that our findings are largely robust. First, 527 additional analyses showed that the within-person relationships were stable across waves (a 528 period of 1 year). Second, another set of additional analyses showed that most effects 529 remained stable until winter 2017. Third, records of online search terms revealed that 530 although interest in privacy-related topics and privacy-enhancing technologies increased 531 after the Snowden revelations, it returned to prior levels after only two weeks (Preibusch, 532 2015). It thus seems that levels of privacy concerns and information sharing, as well as 533 their mutual relationship, are largely robust. 534

In asking how much information respondents share when using the Internet in 535 general, we automatically aggregated different platforms, contexts, and situations. 536 However, privacy mechanisms can differ largely across contexts (Nissenbaum, 2010) and 537 situations (Masur, 2018). Our broad perspective, therefore, is somewhat problematic and 538 limits our capacity to understand and predict the behavior of individual people in specific 539 situations. At the same time, aiming to maximize generalizability, we were able to extract 540 some general underlying patterns, which can serve as a starting point for more 541 contextualized analyses (see below). 542

Some of the effect sizes reported in this study are potentially not large enough to refute the privacy paradox completely. On the one hand, they could be a manifestation of the so-called "crud factor" (Meehl, 1990: 204), which states that all psychosocial measures are related to one another to some extent. On the other hand, additional factors such as expected benefits might play a more important role (Dienlin and Metzger, 2016). In <sup>548</sup> conclusion, although our results suggest that privacy concerns and privacy attitudes are
<sup>549</sup> correlated with information sharing, the importance of privacy concerns should not be
<sup>550</sup> exaggerated. The effects could be larger, and other variables play a role as well.
<sup>551</sup> In this study we measured information sharing using self-reports. However,
<sup>552</sup> self-reports of frequent and routine behaviors are often imprecise and unreliable (Scharkow,
<sup>553</sup> 2016). This represents a profound limitation of our study; whenever possible, future studies
<sup>554</sup> should aim to collect objective observations of specific types of behavior.

Finally, please note that the hypotheses presented in this study were not formally preregistered. At the time when the study was conceived in 2014, we were not yet aware of the importance of preregistration.

#### 558 Future Research

We emphasize that when analyzing the privacy paradox we are likely dealing with small effects (Baruh et al., 2017). Hence, to detect these small effects reliably we need large samples. This is often not the case (Baruh et al., 2017). In conclusion, it is crucial to use statistical designs that allow for sufficient statistical power.

Next, evidence of within-person longitudinal effects is still missing. Although we found significant within-person correlations at T1, they were absent across the 6-month intervals. Together, this suggests that longitudinal effects might exist, but that they take place on a different time interval. Future research could hence probe different intervals. For theoretical reasons (e.g., due to availability heuristics), it is plausible to use short intervals; for statistical reasons (e.g., because of the high stability of privacy concerns), it would also make sense to test longer intervals (Dormann and Griffin, 2015).

In general, we emphasize that our findings should not be overgeneralized. They are conditional on the data we collected, the methods we applied, and the theoretical perspectives we adopted. We stress that analyzing the privacy paradox in other contexts using alternative approaches will likely lead to different results. Although we argue that in <sup>574</sup> most circumstances privacy concerns and behavior should correlate modestly, the exact
<sup>575</sup> extent depends on a many boundary conditions. Future research should hence explicitly
<sup>576</sup> analyze different contexts (Nissenbaum, 2010) and situations (Masur, 2018). Building on
<sup>577</sup> Kokolakis (2017), we suggest to analyze the following boundary conditions:

context (e.g., professional, social, commercial, or health-related);
situation (e.g., new, habitualized, or unexpected);

- mood (e.g., positive vs. negative);
- extent of control (high vs. low);
- type of information processing applied (implicit, heuristic, or peripheral vs. explicit,
   analytic, or central);
- existence of bias (e.g., overconfidence, optimism, comparative optimism, or hyperbolic discounting);
- type of information (e.g., sensitive vs. superficial, biographic, or person-related);

• benefit immediacy and risk diffusion (high vs. low);

object of investigation (e.g., individual people, interactions between people,
 developmental perspectives, critical incidents, societal structures, or historical
 developments).

<sup>591</sup> Specifically, we encourage analyzing privacy behaviors also from a situational <sup>592</sup> perspective, accounting for temporal needs, interpersonal perceptions, contextual cues, or <sup>593</sup> characteristics of communication channels (Masur, 2018). For example, whereas general <sup>594</sup> levels of information sharing are likely best explained using privacy *concerns*, situational <sup>595</sup> information sharing might be best explained using privacy *heuristics* (Sundar et al., 2013). <sup>596</sup> Next to these theory-related boundary conditions there are also methodological ones:

analysis design and perspective (e.g., theoretical, experimental, questionnaire-based,
 interview-based, ethnographic, or computational);

# quality of measurement (high vs. low; low quality less likely to detect statistical significance); sample size (small vs. large; small samples less likely to detect statistical significance); statistical analysis (e.g., SEM vs. Regression; analyses without error control less likely to find statistical significance);

• operationalization (e.g., concerns vs. risk perceptions vs. behavioral attitudes; the more specific, the stronger the relation).

# 606 Conclusion

Being able to show that online behaviors are not paradoxical can be socially relevant. 607 Consider the similar case of fear appeals and protective behavior, where there is also only a 608 small correlation (Witte and Allen, 2000). However, fear appeals are used in public 609 campaigns nonetheless, oftentimes to much success (Wakefield et al., 2010). Likewise, 610 proclaiming that the online sharing of personal information is not paradoxical and that 611 concerns about online privacy matter, could lead to more cautious and reflective behavior. 612 It is probably no coincidence that the General Data Protection Regulation, which 613 strengthens the privacy rights of consumers, was passed in Europe, where privacy concerns 614 are particularly pronounced (European Commission, 2015). 615

In sum, this study showed that when people were more concerned about their privacy, they also shared a little less personal information about themselves online. If respondents considered sharing personal information to be insensible, they disclosed substantially less information. Together, these findings do not support the existence of a privacy paradox, at least in this particular context and operationalization. No evidence of long-term effects was found, however. Further research is needed to understand the potential causal interplay of concerns, attitudes, and behavior.

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